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  Philosophy,	  and	  the	  Real	  World1	  
	  
Abstract:	   	   In	   Strangers	   in	   Our	  Midst,	   David	  Miller	  develops	   a	   ‘realist’	   political	  philosophy	  of	  immigration,	  which	  takes	  as	  its	  point	  of	  departure	  ‘the	  world	  as	  it	  is’	   and	   considers	   what	   legitimate	   immigration	   policies	   would	   look	   like	   ‘under	  these	  circumstances’.	  Here	  I	  focus	  on	  Miller’s	  self-­‐‑described	  realist	  methodology.	  First,	  I	  ask	  whether	  Miller	  actually	  does	  start	  from	  the	  ‘world	  as	  it	  is’.	  I	  note	  that	  he	  orients	  his	  argument	  around	  a	  particular	  vision	  of	  national	  communities	  and	  that,	   in	   so	   doing,	   he	   deviates	   from	   a	   description	   of	   ‘the	   real	  world’.	   In	   shifting	  between	  the	  descriptive	  and	  prescriptive	  without	  clearly	  acknowledging	  it,	  Miller	  undermines	   his	   claim	   to	   be	   outlining	   legitimate	   policies	   ‘under	   these	  circumstances’.	  I	  also	  question	  whether	  Miller’s	  picture	  of	   ‘the	  real	  world’	  takes	  sufficient	   account	   of	   past	   injustice	   and	   its	   ongoing	   relationship	   to	   migration	  regimes.	   I	   maintain	   that	   there	   is	   a	   fundamental	   tension	   between	   Miller’s	  commitments	   to	   his	   brand	   of	   nationalism	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   his	   version	   of	  realism	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  
	  
Keywords:	  David	  Miller,	  immigration,	  realism,	  nationalism.	  	  
Strangers	  in	  Our	  Midst	  contains	  all	  the	  high	  quality	  ingredients	  readers	  have	  come	  to	  expect	  of	  a	  David	  Miller	  classic.2	  It	  has	  the	  style:	  clear	  and	  readable.	  It	  has	  the	  substance:	   a	   ‘communitarian’	   and	   ‘social	   democratic’	   (qualified)	   defence	   of	   the	  state’s	  right	  to	  ‘close	  its	  borders’	  (161,	  57).	  This	  is	  framed	  by	  Miller’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  values	  of	  national	  self-­‐‑determination,	  fairness,	  and	  social	  integration,	  and	  all	  constrained	  by	  his	  distinctive	  version	  of	  ‘weak	  cosmopolitanism’	  (chapter	  9).	  It	  has	  the	  methodology:	  a	  kind	  of	  self-­‐‑described	  ‘realism’,	  which	  ‘starts	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is,	  with	  its	  manifold	  inequalities	  and	  injustices,	  and	  asks	  what	  range	  of	  immigration	  policies	  it	  is	  legitimate	  for	  democratic	  states	  to	  pursue	  under	  these	  circumstances’	  (208n.8).	  As	  Miller	  writes,	  ‘to	  think	  clearly	  and	  coherently	  about	  immigration	  requires	  drawing	  on	  all	  of	  the	  resources	  that	  political	  philosophy	  has	  to	  offer’	  (164).	  His	  latest	  book	  provides	  an	  impressive	  model	  of	  just	  that	  sort	  of	  project.	  	  All	  readers	  will	  welcome	  Miller’s	  most	  comprehensive	  examination	  to	  date	  of	  the	  complex	  questions	  raised	  by	  migration,	  including	  his	  chapters	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  and	  responsibilities	   towards	   refugees;	   his	   discussion	   of	   appropriate	   responses	   to	  irregular	  migrants;	  and	  his	  proposed	  principles	  for	  selecting	  between	  candidates	  for	  admission,	  settlement,	  and	  naturalization.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  First	  presented	  at	  the	  Roundtable	  on	  Migration,	  the	  Association	  for	  Political	  Thought	  Conference	  2016,	  St	  Catherine’s	  College,	  Oxford.	  With	  many	  thanks	  to	  the	  referees	  at	  CRISPP	  for	  the	  helpful	  comments	  and	  to	  Phil	  Parvin	  for	  his	  excellent	  work	  on	  this	  symposium.	  Submitted	  April	  2016.	  	  	  2	  David	  Miller,	  Strangers	   in	  Our	  Midst:	  The	  Political	  Philosophy	  of	   Immigration	   (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2016).	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  Beyond	  the	  headline	  case	  in	  defence	  of	  the	  state’s	  right	  to	  exclude	  and	  against	  a	  human	  right	  to	  immigrate,	  Miller’s	  critics	  will	  find	  plenty	  to	  sink	  their	  teeth	  into,	  including	  Miller’s	  suggestion	  that	  irregular	  migrants,	  having	  broken	  the	  rules	  and	  jumped	  the	  queue,	  ‘should	  be	  made	  to	  do	  something	  to	  redeem	  themselves’	  as	  a	  condition	   of	   being	   granted	   amnesty—which	   may	   include	   asking	   them	   to	  ‘undertake	  part-­‐‑time	  military	  or	   civilian	   service’	   (126).	  Or	   they	  may	   take	   issue	  with	  his	  ‘brain	  drain’	  related	  argument	  that	  receiving	  states	  should	  refuse	  to	  admit	  those	  who	  have	  ‘skills	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  employed	  in	  [their]	  home	  country	  to	  do	  work	  that	  helps	  to	  meet	  the	  basic	  needs	  of	  [their]	  compatriots’	  (111).	  Or	  they	  may	  baulk	  at	  his	  move	  to	  connect	  questions	  about	  responsibilities	  towards	  Syrian	  refugees	  with	   concerns	   about	   brain	   drain,	   in	   his	   endorsement	   of	   Paul	   Collier’s	  proposal	  that,	  rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  admitting	  refugees,	  European	  states	  ought	  to	  help	  fund	  the	  establishment	  of	  ‘industrial	  areas	  near	  to	  the	  [refugee]	  camps’,	  to	  keep	   people	   and	   resources	   in	   region,	   ready	   for	   relocation	   to	   Syria	   when	   the	  conflict	  is	  over	  (170).3	  	  	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  Miller’s	  supporters	  will	  celebrate	  his	  clear	  articulation	  of	   the	  potential	   costs	  of	   large	  scale	  movements	  of	  people:	   the	  valuable	  aspects	  of	  our	  collective	  lives	  that	  could	  be	  lost	  or	  damaged	  or	  endangered,	  and	  the	  duties	  which	  might	  be	  violated,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  any	  move	  towards	  more	  open	  territorial	  and	  civic	  borders.	   Wherever	   we	   stand	   on	   these	   issues,	   we	   must	   all	   agree	   that	   Miller’s	  arguments	  provide	  his	  critics	  and	  fans	  alike	  with	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  food	  for	  thought.	  	  	  Here,	   rather	   than	   take	   issue	   directly	  with	   some	   of	  Miller’s	  more	   controversial	  substantive	   arguments,	   I	   want	   to	   focus	   on	   Miller’s	   general	   approach	   to	   these	  questions.	  He	  claims	   to	   take	  as	  his	   starting	  point	   ‘the	  world	  as	   it	   is’	   and	   to	  ask	  which	  policies	  are	  acceptable	  ‘under	  these	  circumstances’	  (208n.8).	  Not	  for	  him,	  he	  explains,	  the	  kind	  of	  theorising	  which	  begins	  with	  an	  idealised	  vision	  of	  a	  just	  world,	  and	  abstracts	  away	  from	  many	  of	  the	  most	  controversial	  questions	  about	  migration.	  Not	  for	  him	  the	  kind	  of	  otherworldliness	  of	  a	  strong	  cosmopolitan	  point	  of	   departure.	  Not	   for	   him	   a	   kind	   of	   naïve	   if	  well-­‐‑intentioned	   humanitarianism,	  which	  ignores	  the	  fact	  of	  deep,	  principled	  dilemmas	  and	  fools	  itself	  that	  the	  most	  humane	  policy,	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  will	  come	  without	  moral	  and	  political	  costs.	  When	  engaging	   with	   migration	   in	   political	   philosophy,	   he	   maintains,	   we	   do	   well	   to	  realise	  the	  importance	  of	  swallowing	  a	  ‘considerable	  dose	  of	  realism’	  (16).	  	  As	   the	   wide-­‐‑ranging,	   recent	   methodological	   debates	   in	   our	   discipline	   have	  illustrated,	  we	  are	   struggling	  with	   the	  question	  of	   the	  appropriate	   relationship	  between	  political	  philosophy	  and	  ‘the	  real	  world’.4	  We	  struggle	  with	  the	  balance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	   the	   original	   piece,	   see	   Paul	   Collier,	   ‘If	   you	   really	  want	   to	   help	   refugees,	   look	   beyond	   the	  Mediterranean’,	  The	  Spectator,	  8	  August	  2015.	  	  4	  Interesting	  interventions	  in	  these	  diverse	  debates	  include,	  for	  example,	  David	  Runciman,	  ‘What	  is	   Realistic	   Political	   Philosophy?’,	  Metaphilosophy	   (2012),	   vol.	   43,	   no.	   1-­‐‑2,	   pp.	  58–70;	   Andrea	  Sangiovanni,	   ‘Normative	   Political	   Theory:	   A	   Flight	   from	  Reality?’,	   in	  Duncan	  Bell	   (ed.)	  Political	  
Thought	   and	   International	   Relations:	   Variations	   on	   a	   Realist	   Theme	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	  Press,	   2008),	   pp.	   219	   –	   239;	   Laura	   Valentini,	   ‘Ideal	   vs.	   Non-­‐‑Ideal	   Theory:	   A	   Conceptual	   Map’,	  
Philosophy	   Compass	   (2012),	   vol.	   7,	   no.	   9,	   pp.	   654-­‐‑664;	   and	   see	   David	   Miller’s	   own	   ‘Political	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between	  real	  and	  ideal,	  and	  we	  struggle	  along	  many	  dimensions.	  What	  should	  we	  be	   reading?	  What	  are	  we	  supposed	   to	  be	  writing	  about?	  Who	   is	  our	  audience?	  Which	  parts	  of	  the	  ‘real	  world’	  are	  relevant	  to	  our	  analysis,	  at	  which	  stages	  of	  the	  process,	  and	  in	  which	  ways?	  As	  feasibility	  constraints?	  As	  somehow	  constitutive	  of	  our	  theories?	  And	  so	  on.	  	  	  	  So	  what	   are	  we	   to	  make	   of	  Miller’s	   attempt	   at	   a	   realist	   political	   philosophy	   of	  immigration?	  In	  my	  view,	  Miller’s	  book	  serves	  to	  illustrate	  the	  difficulties—even	  dangers—involved	   in	   the	   quest	   to	   deliver	   a	   realist	   political	   philosophy	   of	   this	  particular	  sort.	  	  	  The	  first	  question	  is	  whether	  Miller	  does	  stick	  to	  his	  own	  brief	  and	  start	  from	  ‘the	  world	  as	  it	  is’.	  Well,	  yes,	  he	  is	  theorizing	  about	  a	  world	  of	  sovereign	  states,	  and	  one	  that	   is	   full	   of	   injustice,	   with	   human	   rights	   abuses,	   refugees,	   poverty,	   people	  smuggling,	  and	  irregular	  migration.	  And	  yes,	  he	  explicitly	  draws	  on	  evidence	  from	  research	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  from	  opinion	  polls,	  for	  example—about	  public	  hostility	  towards	  large	  scale	  immigration	  and	  about	  the	  role	  of	  trust	  in	  democratic	  politics,	  for	  instance—and	  seeks	  to	  take	  this	  evidence	  seriously	  in	  developing	  his	  arguments.	  He	  also	  engages	  with	  real	  examples,	   from	  Syria	   to	   the	  Netherlands,	  from	  Canada	  to	  the	  Philippines.	  	  	  But,	  significantly,	  he	  also	  allows	  himself	  to	  orient	  the	  whole	  argument	  around	  one	  of	  politics’	  greatest	  fictions:	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  national	  community,	  which	  ‘conceives	  of	  itself	  as	  extended	  in	  time,	  indeed	  often	  as	  reaching	  back	  into	  antiquity’	  (27).	  As	  we	  know,	  Miller	  favours	  a	  kind	  of	  benign	  version	  of	  nationalism,	  which	  intends	  to	  capture	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   people	   value	   their	   membership	   in	   national	  communities	  and	  capitalizes	  on	  the	  supposed	  instrumental	  benefits	  of	  a	  shared	  national	   identity.5	  Yet	   it	   is	  not	  clear	  exactly	  how	  this	  animating	   idea	  of	  discrete	  national	  communities	  and	  solidaristic	  national	  identities	  fits	  into	  Miller’s	  proposal	  to	  start	  from	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is	  and	  to	  deliver	  arguments	  about	  legitimate	  policies	  for	  liberal	  democracies	  ‘under	  these	  circumstances’	  (208n.8).	  	  	  It	   seems	  obvious	   to	  me	  at	   least	   that	   this	   is	  not	  a	  description	  of	   the	  world	  as	   it	  actually	   is,	   or	   even	   self-­‐‑proclaimed	   liberal	   democracies	   as	   they	   actually	   are.	  Indeed,	  Miller	  himself	  preempts	  this	  response,	  with	  his	  note	  that	  ‘some	  readers’	  will	   detect	   a	   tension	  between	  his	   supposed	   commitment	   to	  delivering	  a	   realist	  political	   philosophy	   of	   immigration,	   and	   ‘this	   too-­‐‑rosy	   picture	   of	   the	   modern	  democratic	  state’	  (180n.10).	  Tellingly,	  he	  concedes	  that	  his	  vision	  of	  the	  ‘goods’	  that	   accompany	   national	   membership	   are	   ones	   that	   ‘actual	   states	   only	   realize	  partially,	  at	  most’,	  but	  he	  believes	  that	  the	  obstacles	  towards	  achieving	  them	  are	  not	  so	  great	  as	  to	  make	  ‘the	  quest	  to	  overcome	  them	  a	  hopeless	  one’	  (180n.10).	  In	  this	  short	  footnote,	  then,	  we	  have	  moved	  quickly	  and	  quietly	  away	  from	  ‘the	  world	  as	  it	  is’,	  towards	  something	  more	  like	  ‘a	  picture	  of	  the	  world	  as	  it	  might	  be’.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Philosophy	  for	  Earthlings’	  in	  David	  Leopold	  and	  Marc	  Stears	  (eds.)	  Political	  Theory:	  Methods	  and	  
Approaches	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  pp.	  29-­‐‑48.	  	  	  5	  See	  his	  On	  Nationality	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1995).	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That	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  in	  itself.	  The	  picture	  Miller	  paints	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  normative	  vision	  of,	  say,	  the	  best	  or	  most	  fitting,	  realizable	  form	  of	  community	  and	  identity	   for	  modern	  mass	   democracies—something	   to	   strive	   towards,	   and	   the	  attainment	  of	  which	  is	  not	  altogether	  impossible	  but	  will	  be	  made	  more	  or	  less	  difficult	   by	   the	   pursuit	   of	   different	   migration	   policies.	   We	   can	   shift	   register,	  between	  the	  descriptive	  and	  prescriptive,	  between	  the	  actual	  and	  the	  desirable,	  for	  example.	  The	  ‘real	  world’	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  the	  starting	  point,	  but	  we	  can	  (indeed,	  ought	   to)	  move	  on	   from	  there.	  All	   the	  same,	   though,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  clear	  about	  
when	  we	  are	  shifting	  register,	  from	  the	  descriptive	  to	  the	  prescriptive,	  from	  the	  here	  and	  now,	  to	  the	  ‘aspirations	  for	  the	  future’.	  Because	  we	  cannot	  draw	  direct	  conclusions	  about	  what	  actual	  states	  are	  permitted	  to	  do	  here	  and	  now,	   ‘under	  these	  circumstances’,	  from	  a	  framework	  that	  relies	  on,	  say,	  an	  idealized	  vision	  of	  them	  as	  housing	  discrete,	  benign,	   ‘liberal’	  national	   communities,	  protecting	   the	  goods	  that	  already	  accompany	  membership	  in	  solidaristic	  national	  communities.	  	  	  However,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  book,	  Miller	  often	  writes	  as	  though	  we	  are	  discussing	  a	  world	  in	  which	  we	  can	  already	  take	  these	  kinds	  of	  communities	  and	  identities	  as	  given,	   as	   entities	   which	   really	   exist	   here	   and	   now.	   In	   effect,	   he	   shifts	   register	  without	  always	  noting	  it.	  	  We	  get	  that	  impression,	  for	  example,	  from	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Miller	   discusses	   the	   immigration-­‐‑related	   decisions	   states	   are	   entitled	   to	  make	  in	  support	  of	  their	  national	  culture,	  such	  as	  when	  he	  writes	  about	  reasonable	  aspirations	  towards	  the	  cultural	  integration	  of	  immigrants	  in	  chapter	  8.	  Yet,	  if	  this	  vision	  of	  national	  states	  doesn’t	   fit	  with	  the	  world	  as	  it	  actually	  is,	  then	  Miller’s	  prescriptions	  which	  take	  these	  as	  given	  offer	  no	  more	  of	  a	  direct	  guide	  for	  this	  real	  world,	  here	  and	  now,	  than	  do	  those	  of	  his	  opponents.	  	  	  The	   deeper	   problem,	   though,	   is	   that	  Miller—unlike	  many	   of	   the	   opponents	   he	  explicitly	  positions	  himself	  against6—is	  actually	  claiming	  to	  speak	  to	  and	  about	  the	   world	   as	   it	   is,	   and	   about	   policies	   acceptable	   under	   current	   circumstances.	  While	   he	   maintains	   that	   different	   policies	   will	   suit	   different	   contexts,	   he	   is	  absolutely	   clear	   about	   the	   general	   principles	   that	   should	   guide	   policies	   about	  admissions,	  naturalization,	  deportation,	  and	  so	  forth.	  Indeed,	  at	  times,	  it	  sounds	  as	  though	  his	  intended	  audience	  is	  today’s	  politicians	  and	  policymakers:	  	  Essentially	   what	   is	   needed	   is	   a	   clear	   policy	   on	   immigration	   that	   can	   be	   set	   out	   and	  defended	  publicly,	  with	  all	  the	  relevant	  data	  about	  how	  the	  policy	  is	  working	  also	  in	  the	  public	   domain.	   It	   should	   cover	   the	   overall	   numbers	   being	   accepted,	   the	   different	  categories	   of	   immigrants,	   the	   criteria	   of	   selection	   being	   used,	   and	  what	   is	   expected	   of	  immigrants	   by	   way	   of	   integration.	   This	   needs	   to	   be	   accompanied	   by	   strong	   border	  controls,	  and	  rapid	  assessment	  of	  the	  status	  of	  those	  who	  are	  admitted	  provisionally,	  for	  example	  as	  asylum	  seekers.	  No-­‐‑one	  can	  pretend	  that	  border	  walls	  and	  fences	  are	  pleasant	  things	  to	  witness,	  but	  if	  citizens	  are	  going	  to	  embrace	  the	  state’s	  immigration	  policy,	  they	  need	  to	  be	  reassured	  that	  the	  policy	  is	  going	  to	  be	  effectively	  enforced,	  and	  that	  the	  people	  who	  are	  allowed	  to	  enter	  are	  the	  people	  who	  meet	  the	  criteria	  that	  it	  lays	  down	  (160).	  	  And	  this	  may	  be	  a	  real	  problem,	  because	  if	  Miller’s	  arguments	  in	  the	  book	  are	  not	  directly	   applicable	   to	   actual	   states	   here	   and	   now,	   then	   politicians	   and	   policy	  makers	  are	  not	  entitled	  to	  draw	  from	  this	  that	  their	  states	  may	  pursue	  the	  kinds	  of	  activities	   that	  Miller	  outlines.	   I	  do	  not	   think	  Miller	  makes	   that	  clear,	  or	  clear	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Such	   as	   the	   kinds	   of	   academics	  who	  write	   about	   the	   ‘ethics’	   rather	   than	   the	  ‘political	  philosophy’	  of	  immigration	  (17).	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enough.	  We	  would	  need	  to	  hear	  a	  lot	  more	  about	  whether	  the	  relevant	  states	  (i.e.	  those	   developing	   and	   defending	   restrictive	   immigration	   policies)	   satisfy	   the	  conditions	  he	  has	   in	  mind,	   and	  about	   the	   implications	   for	   the	  argument	  where	  states	  do	  not	  meet	  those	  conditions.	  	  	  	  A	  further,	  related	  issue	  for	  Miller’s	  approach	  is	  not	  so	  much	  about	  what	  he	  includes	  in	  his	  picture	  of	  the	  real	  world,	  but	  what	  he	  leaves	  out	  of	  it.	  If	  we	  are	  starting	  from	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is,	  then	  we	  are	  starting	  from	  a	  world	  in	  which	  existing	  territorial	  borders	   and	  population	  distributions	  have	   come	  about	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   complex	  ways,	  many	  of	  which	  have	  included	  extensive	  injustices,	  such	  as	  those	  involved	  in	  colonialism,	  slave	  trading,	  wars	  of	  aggression,	  ethnic	  cleansing,	  and	  land	  seizures.	  The	   list	   is	   long.	   But	   Miller’s	   animating	   idea	   of	   benign,	   discrete	   national	  communities	  stretching	  into	  the	  past	  and	  future	  allows	  him	  to	  brush	  over	  those	  kinds	  of	  facts	  about	  the	  world,	  at	  least	  in	  this	  book.	  There	  is	  almost	  no	  mention	  of	  these	  particular	  past	   injustices,	  and	  how	  they	  might	  affect	  our	  thinking	  about	  a	  realist	   political	   philosophy	   of	   migration.7 	  That	   seems	   to	   me	   a	   very	   important	  omission,	  for	  an	  argument	  which	  claims	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  real	  world.	  	  	  In	  a	  sense,	  then,	  I	  think	  that	  Miller’s	  background	  vision	  of	  national	  communities	  impedes	  his	  claim	  to	  adopt	  a	  realist	  methodology.	  The	  national	  community	  has	  various	  explicit	  and	  implicit	  functions	  in	  his	  theory,	  and	  colours	  his	  whole	  vision	  of	  the	  political	  philosophy	  of	  immigration.	  Consider	  the	  book’s	  title,	  Strangers	  in	  
Our	  Midst,	  which	  Miller	  takes	  from	  that	  of	  a	  1965	  article	  by	  his	  own	  supervisor,	  John	  Plamenatz.8	  ‘Some	  readers’,	  Miller	  notes,	  ‘have	  found	  it	  a	  little	  provocative’.	  He	  goes	  on,	   in	  the	  voice	  of	  his	  critic:	   ‘why	  call	   immigrants	  “strangers”,	  and	  why	  assume	  a	  homogeneous	  “we”	  in	  whose	  midst	  they	  are	  being	  set	  down?’	  (18).	  Miller	  replies:	  ‘I	  believe,	  though,	  that	  this	  is	  very	  often	  how	  immigration	  is	  experienced,	  at	   least	   on	   first	   encounter,	   in	   settled	   societies	  most	   of	  whose	  members	  have	   a	  sense	  that	  they	  and	  their	  ancestors	  are	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  a	  place’	  (18).The	  title	  fits	  the	   book	   because	   Miller	   frames	   the	   entire	   argument	   around	   a	   central	   set	   of	  nationalist-­‐‑inflected	   binaries:	   strangers	   and	   citizens;	   ‘immigrants’	   and	  ‘natives’(2);	  ‘newcomers’	  and	  the	  ‘indigenous	  majority’	  (64);	  ‘members’	  and	  ‘those	  who	  belong	  elsewhere’	  (21).	  In	  the	  process,	  I	  think	  he	  fails	  to	  notice	  or	  disregards	  significant	   shades	  of	   grey:	   those	  of	   us	  who	  are	   citizens,	   but	  who,	   for	  whatever	  reasons,	   do	   not	   feel	   that	   we	   belong	  within	   the	   dominant	   national	   culture	   and	  narratives;	   those	   of	   us	   who	   think	   of	   our	   fellow	   citizens	   as	   strangers	   in	   many	  respects;	   those	   of	   us	   who	   were	   born	   in	   one	   country,	   but	   have	   very	   close	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7 	  I	   say	   ‘almost	   no	   mention’	   because	   there	   is	   a	   brief,	   two-­‐‑page	   discussion	   of	  ‘particularity	  claimants’,	  i.e.	  ‘those	  who	  by	  virtue	  of	  past	  events	  already	  stand	  in	  some	  relationship	  to	  the	  state,	  but	  without	  having	  an	  agreement	  that	  guarantees	  them	  a	  right	  of	  entry’.	  And	  he	  concludes	  that	  short	  discussion	  with	  the	  line	  that	  these	   claims	   ‘often	   carry	   considerable	  weight,	   but	  do	  not	   always	   translate	   into	  rights	   to	   immigrate’	   (113-­‐‑115).	  He	  also	   returns	   to	   this	   theme	  at	   the	  end	  of	  his	  Postscript,	  exploring	  how	  European	  states	  should	  respond	  to	  the	  refugee	  crisis,	  and	  he	   cautions	   that	   ‘the	   path	   of	   blame	   and	   guilt	   should	   be	   avoided	  wherever	  possible’	  (173).	  	  8	  John	  Plamenatz,	  ‘Strangers	  in	  Our	  Midst’,	  Race	  and	  Class	  (1965)	  vol.	  7,	  no.	  1.	  pp.	  1-­‐‑16	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connections	   to	   other	   countries	   (including,	   perhaps,	   holding	   citizenship	  elsewhere);	  those	  of	  us	  whose	  near	  ancestors	  were	  migrants	  and	  who	  do	  not	  fit	  comfortably	  within	  a	  national	   ‘us’	  and	  immigrant	   ‘them’	  distinction;	  those	  of	  us	  who	  desperately	  want	  non-­‐‑national	  family	  members	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  immigrate;	  and	  those	  of	  us	  who	  vote	  or	  would	  vote	  for	  pro-­‐‑immigration	  political	  parties.	  So	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  are	  many	  ways	  in	  which	  I	  think	  Miller’s	  nationalism	  steers	  him	  away	  from	  a	  close	  relationship	  to	  ‘the	  real	  world’—or	  at	  least	  from	  the	  real	  worlds	  which	  exist	  beyond	  his	  own	  partial	  perspective.	  	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  though,	  in	  his	  quest	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  real	  world	  as	  he	  sees	  it,	  I	  think	  Miller	  is	  too	  quick	  to	  accept	  unreflective,	  conventional	  ways	  of	  framing	  the	  debate,	   adopting	  well	  worn	   tropes	   and	   binaries	   from	   popular	   discourse	   about	  migration.	  For	  instance,	  he	  endorses	  the	  image	  of	  unauthorized	  migrants	  as	  queue	  jumpers:	  ‘their	  behaviour	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  in	  certain	  respects	  unfair,	  since	  by	  entering	  without	  permission	  they	  are	  at	  the	  very	  least	  engaging	  in	  a	  form	  of	  queue-­‐‑jumping	   with	   respect	   to	   all	   those	   who	   are	   attempting	   to	   enter	   through	   legal	  channels...’	  (117).	  He	  does	  not	  pause	  to	  consider	  whether	  there	  are	  actually	  any	  legal	   channels	   through	   which	   many	   of	   these	   irregular	   migrants	   could	   have	  entered,	   if	   only	   they	  had	  waited	  patiently	   in	   line.	  He	  also	   frames	  his	   argument	  around	  a	  distinction	  between	  ‘refugees’	  and	  ‘economic	  migrants’,	  where	  refugees	  for	  him	  are	  ‘people	  whose	  human	  rights	  would	  be	  unavoidably	  be	  threatened	  if	  they	  remain	  in	  the	  place	  they	  inhabit,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  threat	  arises	  from	  state	   persecution,	   state	   collapse,	   or	   natural	   disaster’	   (167),	   and	   economic	  migrants	  are…	  everyone	  else.	  Why	  try	  to	  divide	  all	  people	  on	  the	  move	  or	  outside	  their	   country	   of	   citizenship/ordinary	   residence	   into	   just	   these	   two,	   rigid	  categories,	   as	   though	   we	   can	   always	   distinguish	   clearly	   and	   constructively	  between	  them?	  Why	  adopt	  the	  politically	  loaded	  language	  of	  ‘economic	  migrant’,	  which	  has	  become	  a	  term	  of	  abuse?	  And	  in	  fact,	  this	  way	  of	  drawing	  the	  distinction	  leads	  him	  to	  describe	  ‘those	  who	  have	  decided	  to	  quit	  refugee	  camps	  where	  they	  were	  protected	  but	  opportunities	  to	  work	  were	  inadequate’	  as	  economic	  migrants	  (169-­‐‑70).9	  	  	  	  	  	  Ultimately,	   I	   agree	  with	  Miller	   that	   any	  political	   philosophy	   about	   immigration	  needs	   to	   engage	   seriously,	   at	   some	   level,	   with	   the	   world	   in	   which	   we	   find	  ourselves.	  But	  I	  think	  we	  have	  quite	  different	  visions	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  political	   philosophy	   and	   the	   ‘real	   world’,	   and,	   perhaps	   more	   fundamentally,	  different	  visions	  and	  experiences	  of	  that	  world.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  It	   is	  worth	  noting,	   too,	   that	  Miller’s	  adoption	  of	   the	  conventional	   ‘refugee’-­‐‑‘economic	  migrant’	  distinction	  alongside	  his	  attempt	  to	  adopt	  a	  revisionist	  definition	  of	  refugees	  leads	  him	  into	  some	  difficulties	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  drawing	  on	  existing	  empirical	  data	  to	  substantiate	  his	  arguments.	  For	  example,	   he	   contends	   that	   ‘the	   overwhelming	   majority’	   of	   migrants	   into	   and	   between	   liberal	  democratic	  countries	   ‘count	  as	  economic	  migrants	  rather	   than	  as	  refugees’	  on	  his	  definition,	  as	  they	  are	  ‘drawn	  in	  by	  the	  advantages	  that	  their	  new	  society	  has	  to	  offer’.	  Indeed,	  he	  adds	  that	  ‘very	  often	  the	  incentive	  to	  move	  is	  strictly	  economic’	  (94).	  In	  the	  accompanying	  footnote	  he	  points	  out	  that	  ‘in	  the	  year	  ending	  March	  2014,	  around	  560,000	  people	  migrated	  to	  Britain,	  of	  whom	  only	  less	  than	   24,000	  were	   admitted	   as	   asylum	   seekers...’	   (194n.1).	   But	  we	   need	   to	   be	   clear	   that	   those	  admitted	  as	  asylum	  seekers	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  far	  smaller	  proportion	  of	  that	  560,000	  people	  than	  those	  who	  meet	  Miller’s	   own	  preferred	   definition	   of	   refugees,	   i.e.	   ‘people	  whose	   human	   rights	  would	   unavoidably	   be	   threatened	   by	   remaining	   in	   the	   places	   they	   now	   inhabit,	   regardless	   of	  whether	  the	  threat	  arose	  from	  state	  persecution,	  state	  collapse,	  or	  natural	  disasters’.	  	  	  	  	  
